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Summary  findings
Agenor examines whether output contractions associated  The author then proposes a vector autoregression
with cyclical output fluctuations and economic crises  technique (involving the detrended  components of real
have an asymmetric effect on poverty. He identifies four  output, the unemployment rate, real wages, and the
potential sources of asymmetry: expectations and  poverty rate) to test whether the initial cyclical position
confidence factors, credit rationing at the firm level  of the economy, and the size of the initial drop in the
(induced by either adverse selection problems or negative  output gap in a downturn,  matter in assessing the extent
shocks to net worth), borrowing constraints at the  to which output shocks affect poverty. He applies the
household level, and the "labor hoarding" hypothesis.  technique to Brazil, using annual data for 1981-99. The
He also identifies some testable implications of these  results indicate that poverty responds asymmetrically to
alternative explanations.  output shocks, showing less sensitivity when the
economy is initially in a downturn.
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11. Introduction
The empirical  evidence  on the social costs of the East Asian financial
crisis has provided  a vivid illustration  of the devastating  impact  that large output
contractions  can have on the poor. In Indonesia,  for instance,  the incidence  of
poverty  (measured  on the basis of the national  poverty  line) rose from 11%  to
18%  between  1996  and 1999.  In Korea,  the urban  poverty  headcount  index  rose
from 8.5% to  18% in  1997-98; and in Thailand, the incidence of  poverty
increased  from 11.4%  in 1996  to 12.9%  in 1998  (Krongkaew  (2000)). Income  of
the poor  fell as a result of both lower  wages  and higher  unemployment  (Horton
and Mazumdar  (2001)).  During  the period 1997-98,  real wages fell by 4.5% in
Thailand, 10.6% in  Korea, and 44% in  Indonesia  (World Bank (2000)). In
Thailand  the open unemployment  rate  rose  from 2.2% in 1997  to 5.3% in 1998,
whereas  in Korea  the urban  unemployment  rate rose  from  2.6% in 1997  to 8.4%
in early 1999. In Indonesia, the increase in open unemployment  was less
dramatic  but was accompanied  by a significant  shift toward  the informal  sector
and a rise  in "disguised"  unemployment.'
Various arguments  have been offered to explain  why economic  crises
may hurt the poor most.  One argument  is that the poor  often lack  the means  to
protect themselves  from adverse income and employment  shocks.  They lack
assets (such as bank deposits and land) and often have no direct access  to
credit  markets  (or face prohibitive  borrowing  costs  when  they do), to smooth  the
impact of these shocks. For the very poor, unfavorable  shocks may be large
enough  to actually result in declines in consumption,  bringing it down below
subsistence  leveis  and affecting  their long-term  nutrition  and health  prospects.  A
second  argument  is that due to the lack of education  and skills,  the poor  tend to
be less mobile  (across  sectors and regions)  than better-educated  workers  and
1 The effect  of the crisis on very  poor households  In Indonesia  was also exacerbated  by
the  dramatic  increase  in  their  cost-of-living  index,  which  resulted  to a large  extent  from the  impact
of the sharp  depreciation  of the exchange  rate on domestic  prices  (see Levinsohn,  Berry,  and
Friedman  (2001)).
2are therefore  often unable  to switch  jobs and capitalize  on available  employment
opportunities  (see for instance Neri and Thomas (2000) for Brazil). A  third
argument  is that indirect sources of income and public transfers may cecline
during crises, because during such episodes the  ability of  relatives (or
communities) to  engage in  income redistribution may  be  reduced and
governments  may be forced  to adjust  drastically  their  fiscal  accounts  with  across-
the-board  cuts in expenditure.
More recently, it  has also been argued that  cyclical downturns and
economic  crises may have  an asymmetric effect on poverty.  Recessions  and/or
sharp output contractions  tend to increase  poverty  rates significantly  (through
some of the channels identified  above),  whereas  expansions  tend to have a
more limited  effect. Lustig  (2000),  for instance,  argued  that the fall in real income
associated  with economic  downturns  may have an irreversible  impact on the
human capital of  the poor. Her argument is that children in poor families
(particularly  the very poor  ones) are sometimes  taken out of school  and put to
work in response  to large adverse shocks-thereby mitigating  the fall in the
household's  income-but  do not return to school when the "good times" roll
again.  To the extent  that adverse  shocks  to household  income  affect adversely
investment  in schooling  (in addition  to nutrition  and health) and the longer-run
ability  of the poor  to enhance  their stock  of human  capital,  they will hinder  their
ability to escape from poverty.  Thus, large recessions  create some sort of
"asymmetric  hysteresis"  effect on poverty,  in the sense of temporary  negative
shocks  having  persistent  effects. 2 However,  the evidence  supporting  this view  is
mixed;  for instance,  Neri and  Thomas  (2000)  found  that in Brazil,  children  are not
more  likely  to drop  out  of school  in recessions  than during  expansions.
2  There have been few attempts to test rigorously whether transitory shocks to poverty
(induced or not by changes in output) may affect the trend (or permanent component) of poverty,
as the "hysteresis"  argument would imply. Lokshin and Ravallion (2000) used dynamic panel data
in a study of household incomes in Hungary t o assess the persistence of shocks. A time-series
based approach could  dwell on  the  unobserved components technique used by Jaeger and
Parkinson  (1990) to test for hysteresis in unemployment.
3Understanding  the sources  of asymmetric  effects  of economic  cycles  and
crises  on poverty,  and assessing  the strength  of these  effects,  have  critical  policy
implications,  particularly  for the design  of social  safety nets.  It is also important
for evaluating  the welfare  costs  of crises  and for judging  the correlation  between
growth  and poverty. Several  recent  studies  have  argued  that this correlation  is
significantly  negative.  After reviewing  a variety  of empirical  studies,  Lustig  (2000)
for instance  concluded  that, in Latin  America,  for every  percentage  point  decline
in output  growth, poverty rises by approximately  two percent.  Others estimate
that in Brazil,  in particular,  the number  of poor  decreases  by approximately  0.6
percent  for every percentage  point  increase  in GDP  (Neri  and Thomas (2000)).
However,  in the presence  of asymmetry,  this relationship  is misleading.  As noted
by  De  Janvry and  Sadoulet (2000, p.  284), if  it  results essentially from
associations  that pertain to recessions  rather than expansions,  it may lead to
erroneous  predictions  about the potential  of growth-oriented  policies  to reduce
poverty.  In fact, the regression  results produced  by De Janvry and Sadoulet
(2000) show  that the effect of income  changes  on poverty  tends indeed  to be
asymmetric;  a one percent  decline  in the growth  rate of income  can annihilate
the poverty-reduction  effects  of more  than  one percent  of income  growth.
Nevertheless,  formal empirical  evidence on the asymmetric  effects of
changes in output on poverty remains very scant. This paper attempts to
contribute  to the debate by examining  whether  output shocks associated  with
either  cyclical  fluctuations  or economic  crises  (which  are often characterized  by a
sharp contraction in  real activity) have an  asymmetric effect on  poverty.
Specifically,  it addresses  two related issues.  The first is whether the initial
cyclical  position  of the economy  (that is, whether  the economy  is in a recession
as opposed  to an expansion  phase)  matters  in assessing  whether  output  shocks
have an asymmetric  impact  on the poor. The second is whether  the magnitude
of the initial drop in the level of output below trend in a downturn ("normal"
recessions  associated  with the business  cycle as opposed  to the "large"  output
contractions observed during periods  of  economic crisis)  may  generate
asymmetries  in the response  of poverty  to output  shocks.
4The remainder  of the paper  is organized  as follows.  Section II identifies
four alternative  channels  through  which  output  shocks  can have  nonlinear  effects
on poverty--in  the sense of generating  not only asymmetric  responses  but also
regime  switches  and  jumps between  equilibria.  These  channels  are expec:.ations
and  confidence factors; credit rationing at  the  level  of  firms,  bor-owing
constraints  at the household  level;  and the "labor  hoarding"  hypothesis. 'Section
IlIl  proposes  a simple vector  autoregression  technique  (involving  the detrended
components  of real output,  real wages,  the unemployment  rate,  and the 1-overty
rate) to test for the existence  of the two types  of asymmetric  effects described
earlier.  This technique  is then applied  in Section  IV to Brazil,  using  annual  data
covering  the period 1981-99.  Finally,  Section  V summarizes  the main results  of
the analysis,  draws some policy implications,  and identifies  possible  directions
for future  research.
11.  Sources of Asymmetric Effects: Theory
This section discusses  several channels  through  which, and conditions
under which, movements  in output (associated,  again, with either "rormal"
cyclical movements  or full-blown crises) can have an asymmetric  eff*ect  on
poverty.  Four main classes  of explanations  are distinguished.  The first is based
on asymmetric  changes  in expectations  and confidence  factors;  the second  on a
"credit  crunch"  at the firm level,  with  rationing  induced  by either  adverse  selection
problems  or negative  shocks  to net worth; the third emphasizes  the impact  of
borrowing  constraints  on household  consumption  behavior;  and  the fourth  dwells
on "labor hoarding"  by firms facing high turnover costs. Whereas credit and
borrowing  constraints  are, in a sense,  "induced"  by the initial adverse  sl-ock to
output, the labor hoarding hypothesis  can be viewed as capturing a "pure"
asymmetric  effect.
51.  Expectations  and  Confidence  Factors
The first possible  source  of asymmetry  in the impact  of output  shocks  on
poverty relates  to expectations  and confidence  factors. The argument  is that
confidence in the economy's  prospects  may change over the course of the
business  cycle and during crises. In particular,  consumers  and firms may be
more pessimistic  during recessions  and crises than they are optimistic  during
expansions,  or immediate  prospects  may matter more during recessions  than
future  prospects.  If consumers  and firms  worry  more about  the overall  economic
outlook  and  the economy's  likely  direction  in a downturn,  a positive  output  shock-
-induced  by, say, a fiscal expansion--may  have a smaller impact  (and thus be
less effective) on private spending decisions during recessions  than during
booms. In addition,  if the degree of uncertainty  about future profitability  rises
during recessions  at the same time that concerns about future profitability
increase,  firms may be less willing  to invest--even  after a large (policy-induced)
positive  shock  to aggregate  demand.  The reason,  of course,  is the "option  value"
associated  with  waiting  for the uncertainty  to dissipate  (Dixit  and Pindyck  (1994)).
If output  and labor demand  become  less sensitive  to positive  shocks  when  the
output  gap is initially  negative,  the initial increase  in poverty  induced  by higher
unemployment  may  be difficult  to reverse.
2.  Adverse  Selection,  Net  Worth,  and  the "Credit  Crunch"  View
Recessions  and  economic crises may  be  accompanied by  high or
increasing  interest  rates for at least two reasons.  First, an economic  slowdown
may raise  the risk of default  (by increasing  the incidence  of adverse  shocks  on
profitability,  for instance).  This may lead banks  to raise the premium  that they
charge  over  and above  the cost of funds, as for instance  in the model  of Agenor
and Aizenman  (1998),  despite downward  pressure  on interest rates resulting
6from a reduction  in the demand  for credit. Second,  at least during the initial
phases  of economic  crises (more  than during  "normal"  recessions),  the need  to
defend the  domestic currency on foreign exchange markets and fend off
speculative  attacks often forces the central bank to raise interest rates.  In
practice,  of course,  both  factors  may  be at play and may  exacerbate  the adverse
impact  of high borrowing  costs on output--particularly  if, as is often the case in
developing  countries,  firms rely significantly  on bank lending to finance their
short-term  working  capital  needs  (Agenor  and  Aizenman  (1998)).
Moreover,  an initial increase  in interest  rates can lead to a tightening  of
credit  constraints  if banks  are unwilling  to lend  to riskier  borrowers,  as implied  by
adverse  selection  models  of the credit market  of the Stiglitz-Weiss  variety  (see,
for instance, Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990)). A  rise in policy interest rates, for
instance,  may lead to higher market interest rates and higher deposit rates.
Banks,  however,  may be reluctant  to pass  on to borrowers,  in the form of higher
loan rates,  the higher  cost of funds that they face. The reason is that because
higher  loan  rates increase  the debt  burden  of borrowers  and  may raise  the risk  of
default  (as noted  earlier),  only riskier  borrowers  are willing  to take on loans.  To
avoid  the deterioration  in the quality of their loan portfolio,  banks may opt to
ration credit. The tightening  of credit constraints  magnifies  the impact of the
initial recession  or output contraction  on borrowing  and spending,  thrcugh a
direct  supply-side  effect.  The resulting  fall in labor  demand  and thus  the effect on
poverty  may  also be (all  else equal)  compounded.  Thus, if credit  constraints  bind
only in periods  in which  output  is below  capacity,  they may  impart  an asyrrimetric
bias  to output  shocks. 3
3 Note that quantity rationing is sufficient but not strictly necessary to explain asymmetry.
The same information problems that lead to quantity rationing may lead banks to charge a steep
risk premium over the (risk-free) market interest rate for a given loan size. Even if fi,ms  can
borrow at that rate, they may still be 'credit  constrained" because the premium may lead them to
forego profitable projects that cannot be financed internally.
7Two factors  may compound  the incidence  of a credit crunch  induced  by
information  problems:
. The first is related to the fact that recessions,  and more significantly
economic  crises,  are sometimes  accompanied  by a process  of concentration  in
the financial  system,  with smaller  financial institutions  being forced to close or
undergo  thorough  restructuring  of their operations.  This often translates  into a
loss of information  about potential bank borrowers.  If, as  a result, adverse
selection problems are  exacerbated,  the credit crunch may become highly
persistent.
*  The second  factor  is related  to the observation  that, in many  developing
countries,  small  and medium-size  firms (particularly  in the manufacturing  sector)
tend  to be more  dependent  on bank  credit  than large  firms. They may therefore
suffer  the most  from  a credit crunch  induced  by a perceived  increase  in the risk
of default  in a downturn. And because  small  and medium-size  enterprises  tend
to use more labor-intensive  production  technologies,  the reduction  in output  and
employment  induced  by the drop in the availability  of credit may be particularly
large, implying a potentially  severe adverse  effect on poverty. Some recent
evidence  on the East Asia crisis suggests  indeed  that the sharp increases  in
interest  rates that were implemented  to defend the exchange  rate during the
crisis  had large  distributional  and poverty  effects  (see  Domac  (1999)).
An alternative  argument  that may explain  a credit  crunch  in an economic
downturn  is based  on net worth effects. In a crisis,  the collapse  in asset prices
(e.g. real estate or equity prices)  may lead to a sharp drop in the value  of the
collateral  against  which firms borrow.  To the extent  that firms (particularly  small
and medium-size  ones) have limited alternatives  to secure loans, banks may
curtail  credit  because  of the drop  in value  of assets  that they can seize  in case  of
default, possibly  affecting smaller firms the most. A lower level of credit will,
again,  reduce  output  and employment,  and eventually  increase  the incidence  of
poverty.  An asymmetric  effect may result from the fact that, after the crisis,
8economic uncertainty may remain high, expectations may remain pessirnistic,
entailing as a result a slow recovery of asset prices.
It is worth noting also that the sharp exchange rate depreciation that often
accompanies financial crises (as was the case in East Asia, for instance) may
also  reduce dramatically the  net worth of  domestic bank borrowers, big  and
small, if their level of  unhedged foreign-currency debt is high. Again, this may
lead banks to  curtail collateralized credit. Asymmetric effects may resul-:  from
persistent uncertainty regarding the exact size of borrowers' foreign lial-:ilities,
and  thus  how  healthy  their  balance  sheets  are,  even  when  the  dornestic
economy starts to  recover.  Thus, the  balance sheet conditions of firms  can
amplify fluctuations in output and negative shocks are likely to have a greater
effect than positive shocks. The fundamental reason is that  net worth effects
make access to the credit market pro-cyclical. 4
3.  Borrowing Constraints  and Household Consumption
A third potential source of asymmetry in the response of poverty to output
shocks relates to credit constraints and their impact on the ability of households
to  smooth  consumption.  The  reason  is  that,  as  discussed  earlier,  such
constraints  may  become  binding during  recessions, as  a  result of  adverse
selection or net worth effects, because household wealth may be also adversely
affected by sharp drops in asset prices. In addition, increases in interes: rates
may cause an asymmetric effect on  consumption (and thus poverty) through
permanent income effects.  In the  model of  Jackman  and  Sutton (198l2), for
instance, higher  interest rates  may  force  constrained consumers  to  reduce
spending by the full amount that their loan payments increase. Lower rate(3  relax
4For  instance. in the models of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1999)), firms may be credit constrained because of low collateral. When firms are fully
collateralized, and hence unconstrained, sharp declines in investment spending are more likely
than sharp increases. The reason is that credit constraints typically bind during recessions, when
net worth is low.
9the  constraint, but spending increases less than  proportionately  because
consumers  spread  out  their  spending  across  time.
In principle,  the possibility  of binding borrowing  constraints  in adverse
state of nature does  not, by itself,  result in an asymmetric  effect.  The reason  is
that  households  may well  be able to  achieve some level of  consumption
smoothing  by depleting  their assets (selling land, for instance)  or using non-
market  mechanisms  (such  as increased  own production).  It is also possible  that
households  may "internalize"  state-dependent  credit constraints.  In particular,
they may decide, in response  to income risk, to accumulate  more assets or
engage  in precautionary  savings  in "good"  times  in order  to shelter  consumption
in "bad"  times; recent  evidence  on this type of ex ante risk-mitigating  strategy  is
provided  by  Agenor  and  Aizenman  (2000)  for sub-Saharan  Africa.
Nevertheless,  for the poor specifically,  the available  evidence  suggests
indeed that risk-sharing  and consumption  smoothing remain imperfect--if  not
unfeasible  (see Morduch  (1995, p. 107)).  The poorest  households  are typically
those least insured against shocks because of their inability to accumulate
assets  and because,  as noted  earlier,  asymmetric  information  problems  and high
transaction  costs may completely  preclude  access for them to private  market
insurance  or credit mechanisms  to smooth income fluctuations.  As a result,
consumption  smoothing  through borrowing  and lending is simply not feasible.
Poor households  may then have no option but to engage  in either sub-optimal
labor allocation  decisions  (such as forcing  children  to quit school and work, as
noted  in the introduction),  or to let consumption  fluctuate  as much as income--
with possibly  devastating  long-run  effects  on health  and nutrition.
4.  The  "Labor  Hoarding"  Hypothesis
Yet another  source  of asymmetry  in the effect  of output  shocks  on poverty
is the "labor  hoarding"  hypothesis,  highlighted  in Agenor  (1998).  The argument  is
10that recessions  and crises  worsen  poverty  because  of an asymmetric  effect on
employment and  productivity.  In  a  recession or  crisis-induced  contraction,
unskilled  workers  (among  which  the poor  tend  to be concentrated)  are often the
first to lose their  jobs as firms "hoard"  their  trained  labor force (skilled  workers).
The incentive  to hoard  is related  to the existence  of high  turnover  costs (hiring,
training  and firing costs)  associated  with the use of skilled labor,  and is h gher
the more the shock is perceived  to be temporary,  regardless  of its size. When
the "good  times"  come back,  firms may naturally  want, in priority,  to recoup  the
productivity  losses  and foregone  profit  opportunities  incurred  during  the downturn
and return their skilled labor force to a state of high productivity.  Given the
greater degree of complementarity  between  skilled labor and physical capital
(that is, the fact that the elasticity  of substitution  between  these two factors  is
generally lower than the elasticity of substitution  between any of them and
unskilled  labor), they may be tempted to increase  fixed investment  instead  of
increasing  their  demand  for unskilled  labor.  This may occur  despite  the fact that
actual wages for that category  of workers  may fall proportionately  more than
skilled  workers'  wage  and the price  of capital,  and unskilled  workers'  reservation
wage  may  have  been adjusted  downward.  Moreover,  the tendency  to hire  skilled
workers  when the "good times"  return may be particularly  high if firms incurred
sunk  costs associated  with investment  in physical  capital  prior  to the contraction
in output. Thus, the combination  of high turnover costs and a low degree of
substitutability  between  skilled  labor and physical  capital  may produce  a strong
degree  of persistence  in unskilled  unemployment  and poverty  in the aftermiath  of
a negative  shock  to output.
11Ill. Testing for Asymmetric Effects: Methodology
The  various channels through which  output shocks can  generate
asymmetric  effects  have  different  testing  implications,  which  in principle  could  be
used to discriminate  among them in a particular  sample.  For instance,  an
empirical  test of the "credit crunch"  view would imply looking  at the share of
collateralized  credit,  the amount  of firms' borrowing  on world  capital  markets  (or,
more specifically,  the share of unhedged,  short-term  foreign currency  liabilities
incurred  by firms),  the behavior  of asset  prices  (including  exchange  rates)  during
periods  of economic  downturns,  and more  generally  changes  in balance  sheets.
Examining  data on the composition of credit,  namely,  the share  of lending  going
to small  and medium-size  firms, would also be important.  The relevance  of the
"labor hoarding"  hypothesis  can be assessed  by examining  the importance  of
turnover  costs,  changes  in the  composition  of the labor  force and the behavior  of
productivity during recessions  and  upturns, and  the  behavior of  physical
investment  immediately  after crises. Indeed, as noted earlier, the hypothesis
predicts  a change in the composition  of the factor mix (notably,  an increase  in
capital and skilled labor intensity  relative  to unskilled  labor) in the immediate
aftermath  of a recession  or a large  output  contraction.  Interestingly  enough,  Neri
and Thomas (2000)  found (using  survey  data for the past two decades)  that in
Brazil  less-educated workers fell  into  poverty at  a  greater  rate  during
recessions-a result  consistent  with  the labor  hoarding  hypothesis.
The  objective  of this  paper  is, however,  far less  ambitious.  As noted  in  the
introduction,  it focuses  on two aspects  of the debate:  whether  the initial cyclical
position  of the economy,  and the magnitude  of the initial drop in the level of
output  below  trend in a downturn,  matter  in assessing  the extent  to which  output
shocks  have  an asymmetric  effect on poverty.  To this end, and given  the focus
of the present study on short-run dynamics, it  proposes a standard vector
autoregression  (VAR)  model  involving  a small  set of stationary  variables.
12Specifically,  the variables  that I suggest  to include in the VAR are the
detrended  components  of output,  the open unemployment  rate,  real wages,  and
the poverty  rate. 5 These  variables  are chosen  on the premise  that adjustmrnt  to
an output shock takes place in the short term primarily  through  two channels:
either a change in unemployment  or a change in real wages. 6 Controlling  for
changes  in these two variables  in assessing  the impact of output shoc:es  on
poverty is thus essential. In general, of course, the impact of the shc'k  on
poverty  will depend  on  what group  is hit the most  by the rise in unemployment  or
the fall in real wages.  If movements  in these  two variables  affect primarily  prime
age working  males  with low education,  poverty  may increase  significantly.  Thus,
it may be important  to include  in the VAR, in addition  to standard  measures  of
the cyclical  component  of output  and  the  detrended  component  of (the log  of) the
poverty rate, a  measure of  unemployment  that  reflects well  labor market
conditions  faced by unskilled  workers  (as a proxy  for "vulnerable"  groups),  and a
real wage index that is representative  of wages earned by the poor-say,  an
index  of unskilled  workers'  wage, or informal  sector  wages.  It is also pcssible
that changes in open unemployment  are not highly correlated with output
fluctuations,  because  adjustment  to changes  in labor  demand  takes the form  of
large movements  in the labor force between  the formal  and informal  sectors;  in
such conditions,  the open unemployment  rate  should  be replaced  by a measure
that captures  such movements.
5 Because  these  variables  are likely  to be  stationary,  using  a vector  cointegration  approach  is
not  required.  An alternative  approach  would  be  to specify  a VAR model  in which  all variables  are
measured  in levels  despite  being  nonstationary.  As shown  by Sims,  Stock  and Watson  (1990),
least-squares  estimates  are consistent  for the  levels  specification  (whether  cointegration  exists  or
not),  whereas  a differenced  specification  is inconsistent  if some  variables  are cointegratec.  But  in
the absence  of cointegration,  the estimated  standard  errors of the levels specification  are not
consistent,  so conventional  inference  could  potentially  be misleading.  Note  also that testing  for
cointegration  in the  present  case  would  be problematic,  given  the  small  size  of the  sample.
6 However,  as noted  in the introduction,  recessions  and  crises  may be  accompanied  also  by
changes  in intra-family  allocation  of income  or government  transfers. These changes  can be
expected  to matter  more  during  severe  output  contractions  relative  to "normal"  cyclical  downturns.
The extent to which these variables  matter,  nevertheless,  is case specific  and can be formally
tested  using  the  block  exogeneity  test described  below.
13Innovations  in the output  gap are used  to measure  real shocks,  and the
standard  Choleski  decomposition  is used  to identify  impulse  response  functions.
Specifically,  to implement  the Choleski  decomposition  of the covariance  matrix,
the disturbances  in the model are assumed to follow the following causal
ordering:  output gap innovations--real  wages innovations--unemployment  rate
innovations--poverty  rate innovations.  The fact that the output gap and the
unemployment  rate are placed  before  the poverty  rate in the VAR captures  the
assumption  that shocks  to poverty  have no contemporaneous  impact  on these
variables. Any  contemporaneous  correlation between a  disturbance  to the
poverty  rate and the output  gap,  for instance,  is thus taken to reflect  causation
from  output  to poverty,  and not  the other  way  around.
Once  a VAR is specified,  the second aspect  of the procedure  proposed
here  consists  in specifying  the way in which potential  asymmetric  effects  of the
business  cycle and crises on poverty  can be assessed. 7 To test whether  the
effect of output shocks on poverty may depend on the initial phase of the
business  cycle,  I use the sign of the output  gap (positive  or negative);  and  to test
whether  the size of initial adverse  shocks matters,  I use a distinction  between
"normal"  recessions  and "deep" contractions.  The first test is implemented  by
partitioning  the sample  on the basis  of whether  (the logarithm  of  the output  gap
is initially  positive  or negative.  Specifically,  let D be a dummy  variable  that takes
the value 1 if the output  gap is positive  and 0 otherwise,  and let x denote the
output  gap. To account  for asymmetric  effects  the VAR system  is expanded  to
five variables  by replacing  x in the "symmetric"  VAR model by two measures  of
the state of the business  cycle: x+ = Dx, and x- = (1-D)x. 8 To implement  the
second  test, the sample  is partitioned  into three  groups  of observations:  those  for
7This  follows  Macklem  (1995)  and  Agenor  (2001).
8 The ordering  chosen has now x+ and x  as the two most endogenous  variables.  The
ordering  of the latter two variables  is purely  arbitrary;  but the results  are not sensitive  to the
ordering  shown here. In addition,  I also entered  the dummy variable  directly in each of the
equations  of the expanded  VAR so as to allow the intercept  to shift along with the slope
coefficients.  The variable  was not significant  and was dropped  from the final specification  to
economize  on degrees  of freedom.  Finally,  the optimal  lag length  chosen  for the symmetric  VAR
is imposed  in each  case,  in order  to facilitate  comparisons  with  the symmetric  case.
14which  the output  gap is positive,  those in which  the output  gap is negative  but
less than 4 percent in absolute  terms, and those in which the output cap is
>3jative and  greater  than 4  percent in  absolute  terms. The VAR is  now
expanded  to  s!x  variables by  replacing x  in the "symmetric"  model by three
measures  of movements  in output:  x+  = Dx, x-s  = (1-D)Zx,  and  x-L =  (1-D)(1-Z)x,
where Z iS a  durmmy  variable that takes the value 1 (respectively 0) if the (crop  in
tLe output  gao is smaller  (respectively  greater)  than 4 percent. The idea h-ere  is
teat negative  shocks  that entail  a drop  in output  that is smaller  than  4 percentage
Points represent "normal' recessions,  whereas  drops in the output gaip  that
cAed  4 percentage  points  are associated  with a "crisis"  of some  sort.  Altiough
'I  .e choice  '  f a 4 percent  threshold  may appear  to be somewhat  arbitrary there
ev1ie,dIce  to  suipport  this  choice.  Lustig  (2000),  for instance,  in a study  focusing
*o  n  23 Gountries in Latin Arnerica and the  Caribbean during  1980 and  1998,
i.+-Cndl  that there were over 40  episodes where GDP per capita fell  by 4
-. rcentaqe  points  or more.  In another  study,  dwelling  on a sample  of 36 banking
c.rses  in  35 Orc-wuntries,  Dem,irguc-Kunt  et al. (2000) found that a banking crisis is
typically  ac-compan,ed  by a decline  in output  growth  of the order  of 4 percentage
'zoints. Nevertheless,  some sensitivity  analysis  would generally  be wairranted
(see  the discussion  below).
:  assess whether  any of the two "control"  variables  (that is, either the
Unemployment  rate or the  real wage) or  any additional variable (stuch  as
govecrnment  transfers to the poor) should be included in the VAR, a  block
exogeneity Kor block  causality)  test can be performed  by estimating  bcth the
'unrestf-icted'  and  "restricted"  VARs (that is, with and without the  cyclical
clm  rnponernt  of the variable  of interest)  to obtain  the variance-covariance  matrix  of
the residutas associated  with  the unrestricted  and restricted  models,  Qu and Oc.
Deficie  the likelihood ratio statistic, A,  as
A = (T-c) (loglOcl - logl0ul),
15where IlcI  (respectively  Ilul)  is the determinant  of Qc (respectively  Du), T the
number  of observations,  and c the number  of parameters  (equal  to the number
of lags  times  the number  of variables,  plus one for the constant  term)  estimated
in each equation  of the unrestricted  system.  This statistic  has a x2 distribution
with degrees  of freedom  equal  to the number  of restrictions  in the systern,  equal
to one  times  the number  of lags.
IV. An Application  to Brazil,  1981-99
The above procedure  was applied  to Brazil,  using annual  data over the
period  1981-99.  Brazil  is an interesting  case  to test the methodology  described  in
the previous  section because  of the availability  of sufficiently  long time-series
data to ensure  adequate  degrees  of freedom. It is also one of the few countries
for which several ongoing studies have focused on assessing  the impact of
macroeconomic  variables  on poverty.  Paes  de Barros  et al. (2000),  for instance,
in a study  based  on micro-simulation  techniques,  found that unemployment  has
a major  impact  in relative  terms  on the  behavior  of poverty  rates. 9
The variables  included  in the VAR, in addition  to the (log of the) output
gap, are the cyclical components  of the (log of the) aggregate  unemployment
rate,  the real minimum  wage  (which  plays  a key role in the distribution  of wages
in Brazil,  as noted for instance  by Neri and Thomas (2000)),  and the poverty
headcount  index. Capacity output (with output measured by  real  GDP) is
measured  using a univariate  technique,  the Hodrick-Prescott  (HP) filter (see
Hodrick  and Prescott  (1997)).1° More precise  definitions  of these variables  are
9 Neri  and  Thomas  (2000)  analyzed  the effects  of aggregate  shocks  on the poor in Brazil,
using  incomes  rather  than  consumption  expenditures.  See De Ferranti  et al. (2000,  pp.  76-77)  for
a discussion  of their  results.
10  It should  be kept in mind, however,  that because  of the difficulties  involved  in measuring
capacity  output,  the output  gap  is likely  to be  subject  to a significant  margin  of error.
16provided  in the Appendix,  which  also reports  the results  of standard  Augmented
Dickey-Fuller  stationary  tests. These results indicate  that all the variables,  as
defined here, are stationary.  A  "standard"  VAR approach (that is, one that
ignores cointegrating  relationships  between  the variables in level form),  can
therefore  be used.  The real minimum  wage  is used  as a proxy  for the unskilled
real wage; evidence  for Brazil  indicates  that these two series are indeed  highly
correlated.  Nevertheless,  to verify  that the real minimum  wage  "belongs"  to the
VAR, I applied the block exogeneity  test described  earlier.  As reported  in the
Appendix,  the results  indicate  that the null hypothesis  (exclusion  of the cy:l,ical
component  of the real minimum  wage  from the VAR) is soundly  rejected  by the
likelihood  ratio  test.
Figure 1 shows the evolution  of  the cyclical components of all the
variables included in the VAR. The data illustrate fairly well the pro-cyalical
behavior  of the real minimum  wage and the counter-cyclical  behavior  of the
unemployment  and poverty rates."  Given my 4 percent threshold,  the data
indicate  that 1983,  1984,  and 1992  can be identified  as "crisis"  periods.
The impulse response  functions  over 24 years associated  with a  one
standard deviation  shock to the innovation  in the output gap are shovin in
Figures  2, 3 and 4, for both  the symmetric  and  asymmetric  cases.  The solid  lines
in the figures represent  the impulse  responses  themselves,  whereas  the dotted
lines are the associated  95 percent  upper  and lower  confidence  bands. 12 G3iven
the relatively  small size of the sample,  the use of standard  criteria  for choosing
the optimal lag length (such as the Akaike criterion)  is not feasible;  instead,  I
relied on a visual inspection  of the impulse  response  functions  associated  with
an output  shock in the symmetric  case and compared  the results  with one and
11Note  the sharp  drop in the cyclical  component  of the poverty  and unemployment  rates  in
1986, which reflects movements in the original series. The data compiled by Wodon et al. ,2001)
indicate  also,  as in the  dataset  used  here,  a sharp  drop  in poverty  in  that  same  year.
12  The impulse  responses  and their associated  confidence  intervals  are computed  using
Monte  Carlo  simulations  employing  1,000  draws.
17two lags.  The results  are shown  in Figure  2; they indicate  clearly  that the degree
of significance  is very  similar  in both  cases,  although  the impulse  responses  are
(as can be expected)  a bit more  "choppy"  with  two lags compared  with one lag.
Accordingly,  and to economize  degree  of freedom,  I examine  the asymmetric
cases  using  the one-lag  VAR.
The results  of the first experiment  are reported  in Figure  3. They show  a
clear asymmetric  response  in the real minimum  wage and the unemployment
rate,  depending  on the size  of the initial  output  gap:  when  output  is initially  above
trend,  a positive  output  shock raises real wages  and lowers  unemployment  (as
theory  would suggests),  in addition  to reducing  poverty.  All three effects are
statistically  significant,  but the wage and poverty  effects  dissipate  fairly rapidly.
By contrast, when output is  initially below trend (whether it  is  a  "normal"
recession  or a "crisis-related"  contraction,  according  to the definition  adopted
above)  only  the poverty  effect  is significant--and  barely  so.
Figure 4 reports  the second  experiment.  The results  obtained  when  the
output  gap is positive  are very similar  in size  and degree  of significance  to those
reported  in the previous  figure.  However,  now neither  the poverty  effect nor the
unemployment  effect are significant  when the output gap is initially negative,
regardless  of whether  the fall in output  exceeds  4 percent. There is a delayed,
significant  response  of the real minimum  wage  that lasts  for about  a year, in the
direction  expected.
To assess (at least to some degree) the robustness  of the results, I
performed  two types of sensitivity  tests. First, I considered  several alternative
orderings,  with the poverty rate always appearing  last in the sequence;  the
results  remained  virtually  unchanged.  Second, the  asymmetric experiments
were repeated  with a 3 percent  threshold  for the drop in the output gap.  The
results,  again, were virtually  identical  to those reported  here. The conclusion,
then, is that  the  response of the  poverty rate to  output shocks is  state
dependent;  when  output  is initially  above  trend,  any positive  shock  tends  to lower
poverty.  By contrast,  in a recession  or in a period  of severe  contraction,  output
18shocks  have  no  discernible  effect  on  poverty-and  neither  do  they  3ffect
unemnployment.  These results are consistent with several aspects of the various
sources  of  asymmetry  described  earlier.  In  particular,  more  pessimnistic
expectations about future  profitability in a downturn may lead firms to  refrain
from  expanding their  labor force--even  in  response to  a  positive  shock to
aggregate demand.
V.  Concluding  Remarks
Recent  research on  the  impact of  economic crises  on  the  pocr  has
emphasized that  temporary  negative income  shocks  may  have  perrranent
effects on  poverty.  In  addition  to  this  "hysteresis" effect,  it  has alsc  been
recognized that over the short run business cycles and  economic crises may
have  an  asymmetric effect  on  poverty-poverty  may  increase  more  Juring
periods of econcmic contractions than it decreases in an equivalent expansion.
A common explanation is that parents may be forced to take their childrerl out of
school to  engage them  in income-generating activities  (Lustig (2000)).  Even
though a recession typically lowers the opportunity cost of schooling, a [inding
subsistence constraint may force poor households to  reallocate their children's
time aw.ay  from schooling and toward work. Because of the irreversibilities that
characterize investment in education, even short-lived crises may have serious
song-term detrimental effects  on  the  ability  of  the  poor  to  escape  poverty.
However,  the formal evidence in favor of this interpretation remains weak.
This paper attempted to contribute to the existing literature on asyn^metric
effects by focusing on two related issues.  The first is whether the initial cyclical
position of the  economy (that is, whether the  economy is in a  recession as
opposed to an expansion phase) matters in assessing whether output shocks
have an asymmetric effect on poverty. The second is whether the magnitude of
19the initial drop in the level of output below trend in a downturn ("normal"
recessions  associated with the business cycle, as  opposed to  a  "severe"
contraction  induced  by an economic  crisis) may generate  asymmetries  in the
response  of poverty to output  shocks.  The first part of the paper provided  a
review  of several alternative  channels  through  which output shocks can have
nonlinear  effects  on poverty.  They include  expectations  and confidence  factors;
credit rationing  at the level  of firms; borrowing  constraints  at the household  level;
and the "labor  hoarding"  hypothesis.  The "credit  crunch"  argument  is based  on
the view  that higher  interest  rates  (which  may be implemented  in the context  of
an economic  crisis to defend the exchange  rate) do not only have a negative
demand  and supply-side  effects;  they also tend  to discourage  less risky  potential
borrowers.  If lenders  have  no adequate  way of discriminating  between  high  and
low-risk  borrowers and internalize  this adverse selection problem, a market-
clearing  equilibrium  may not exist, and instead there may be persistent  credit
rationing-particularly  of small and medium-size  enterprises,  prepared  to pay
higher  interest  rates,  but unable  to obtain  any funds.  The second part proposed
a simple  vector autoregression  technique  (involving  the detrended  components
of output, real wages,  the unemployment  rate,  and the poverty  rate) to test for
the existence  of the two  types  of asymmetric  effects  described  earlier.  The third
part applied  this technique  to Brazil,  using annual  data for the period 1981-99.
The results of impulse response  analysis indicated  that the response  of the
poverty  rate to output  shocks  is state dependent;  when output is initially  above
trend,  any positive  shock  tends  to lower  poverty.  By  contrast,  in a recession  or in
a period of severe contraction,  output shocks have no discernible  effect on
poverty-and neither  do they  affect unemployment.
There are several  directions  in which  the present  study  can be extended.
The first is to broaden the sample to consider a time-series,  cross-section
dataset of "economic  crises" and a comparative  sample of "tranquil  times," in
order to assess (using possibly  panel VARs) the extent to which the results
reported  here  for Brazil  hold  more  generally.  Another  direction  is to abandon  the
"standard"  VAR approach  and use a vector  error correction  model  that integrates
20both the short- and long-run effects of output shocks on poverty. Th.s is,
however,  a more demanding  task, because  it requires  a model that explicitly
accounts  for the long-term  determinants  of poverty,  such  as access  to education
and the degree of labor mobility  across sectors.  Finally, a more amb  tious
agenda  would be to devise  a test that would allow researchers  to discrinminate
between  the different  sources  of asymmetric  effects highlighted  earlier.  This is
important  because mitigating  the impact of different sources of asymrnetry
requires  different  types of policy  responses.  For instance,  whereas  it is difficult
for policymakers  to have much direct impact on expectations  and conficence
factors,  they may have more leeway  in influencing  hiring and firing costs--and
thus in mitigating  their disincentive  effects  on the demand  for unskilled  labor  in a
sharp  contraction.
21Appendix
Brazil:  Data  Sources  and Unit  Root  Tests
This Appendix  describes  the sources  of the data for Brazil used in this
paper  and unit root tests on the raw series.  The data cover the period  1981-99
and  are defined  as follows:
Y_CYC:  Cyclical  component  of real GDP  calculated  as the log difference
of real GDP and its trend component,  calculated  by using  the Hodrick-Prescott
filtering  method. Data  source  for real  GDP:  World Development  Indicators  2000,
World Bank.
POVER_CYC:  Cyclical component of  the  poverty headcount index,
calculated  as described  in the definition  of Y_CYC.  There are two missing  points
in the poverty  headcount  index  series,  1991  and 1994.  These  missing  points  are
substituted  by the fitted values  that are obtained  by running  an OLS regression
with  the log of the poverty  headcount  index  as the dependent  variable,  and the
log  of the unemployment  rate and the log of real GDP  as independent  variables.
The  data  source  for the index  is the IPEA  website  (www.ipea.gov.br).
WAGE_CYC:  Cyclical  component  of the real minimum  wage, calculated
as described  in the definition  of Y_CYC.  The data source  for this series is also
the IPEA  website  (annual  averages  are calculated  from  the monthly  data).
UNEMP_CYC:  Cyclical  component  of the unemployment  rate, calculated
as described  in the definition  of Y_CYC.  The data  source  for unemployment  rate
is also the IPEA  website  (obtained  in turn from the monthly  employment  survey
of IBGE,  with  annual  averages  are calculated  from  the monthly  data).
POS (NEG): Dummy variable which is  equal to  one times Y_CYC
whenever  Y_CYC  is positive  (negative)  and  zero  otherwise.
NEG_L:  Dummy  variable  which is equal to one times Y_CYC  whenever
Y_CYC  is less  than -4%  and  zero  otherwise.
NEG_S:  Dummy  variable  which is equal to one times Y_CYC  whenever
Y_CYC  is between  -4%  and 0 and  zero  otherwise.
22The block  exogenity  test statistic  to check  whether  the cyclical  compoInent
of the unemployment  rate belongs  to the VAR system  that includes  the oJtput
gap and the  detrended  component  of the poverty  rate is 73.0, with 2 degrees  of
freedom (statistically  significant  at 1 percent  significance  level).  The sameI  test
statistic to check whether  the cyclical component  of the real minimum  wage
belongs  to the VAR system  that includes  the output gap and the detrended
components  of unemployment  and the poverty  rates is 78.1 with 2 degrees  of
freedom  (statistically  significant  at 1 percent  significance  level).
The unit root (Augmented  Dickey Fuller) test statistic for the c'vclical
component of  the  poverty rate  is  -3.418 and  significant at  a  5  percent
significance  level  according  to MacKinnon's  critical  values  for rejection  of the null
hypothesis  of a unit root.  The unit root  test statistic  for the  detrended component
of unemployment  rate is -2.978  and significant  at 10 percent.  The unit root  test
statistic for the cyclical component  of the real minimum wage -3.889 and
significant  at 1 percent. Finally,  the unit root test statistic for the detrended
component  of real GDP  is -4.975  and significant  at 1 percent.
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25Figure 1
Brazil:  Cyclical  Components  of Real  GDP,  Unemployment  Rate,  Real  Minimum  Wage,
and  Poverty  Headcount  Index,  1977-99  1/
Poverty  headcount  index ----  Unemployment  rate
0.3
Real  GDP
-0.1
-0.3
-0.5
1977  1979  1981  19B3  1985  1987  1989  1991  1993  1995  1997  1999
- Real  minimum  wage
0.1
,  v  11B Ar
-0.1  Real  GDP
-0.3  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I
1977  1979  1981  1983  1985  1987  1989  1991  1993  1995  1997  1999
1/  The cyclical component of each variable is defined as the log difference  of the variable from its trend value
calculated by using  the Hodrick-Prescott  filtering method.Figure  2
Brazil:  Impulse  Response  Function  to One-Standard  Deviation  Innovation  to Cyclical  Output
(Symmetric  Case)
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Note: Cyclical components of each variable are used.Figure 3
Brazil:  Impulse  Response  Function  to One-Standard  Deviation  Innovation  to Cyclical  Output
(Asymmetric  Case)
Positive Output Gap
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Note: Cyclical components  of each variable are used. The VAR model is estimated using a uniform one-period  lag.Figure 4
Brazil:  Impulse Response  Function  to One-Standard  Deviation  Innovation  to Cyclical  Output
(Asymmetric  Case)
Positive  Output  Gap
0  07  0 1
006  Real  minimum  wage  0  05  Unemployment  rate  Poverty  rate
0 05
0.04~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~00
-0,04  015-1
0.03
0.01~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
0.05~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0
-0.0
-0 02  -0,15  '  1
-0.04  02  .1
1  4  7  10  13  16  19  22  . 4  7  10  13  16  19  22  1  4  7  10  13  16  '  22
Negative  Large  Output  Gap
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Negative  Small  Output  Gap
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Note: Cyclical  components  of each  variable  are  used.  The  VAR  model  is  estimated  using  a uniform  one-period  lag.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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